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Abstract
With the recent advance of micro-blogs and social networks, people
can view and post comments on the websites in a very convenient way.
However, it is also a big concern that the malicious users keep pol-
luting the cyber environment by scamming, spamming or repeatedly
advertising. So far the most common way to detect and report ma-
licious comments is based on voluntary reviewing from honest users.
To encourage contribution, very often some non-monetary credits will
be given to an honest user who validly reports a malicious comment.
In this note we argue that such credit-based incentive mechanisms
should fail in most cases: if reporting a malicious comment receives
diminishing revenue, then in the long term no rational honest user will
participate in comment reviewing.
1 Introduction
It is out of question today is in the era people can easily share their own
opinions on social websites [1, 2]. Unfortunately this great advancement also
attracts malicious users who keep posting false or meaningless information
online for their own benefits. For example, sybil attacks recently develop very
fast and receive a lot of attention from the researchers [3, 4]. So far the most
common countermeasure against malicious comment pollution is to rely on
the power from the honest users, who are usually the majority. Honest users
will not only obey the online community rules, but also faithfully report any
violating comments they have read to the administrators. Assuming most
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users are honest, a voluntary comment reviewing scheme can be built. This
is almost a basic feature of every comment-sharing or social website today.
However, it is clear that a rational honest user will not actively participate
in a purely voluntary reviewing system: finding violating comments and
writing reports require human effort, and very often the content of malicious
comments shall make the readers unpleasant. Doing comment reviewing
always incurs cost. If the cost is too much to tolerate, the honest users
will not read the comments any more: they can leave away or block related
comments from their devices. If there is no incentive to the honest users,
most rational people cannot contribute reports to the administrators in the
long term. Thus an incentive mechanism is needed to encourage involvement,
and in fact some websites have tried this idea.
Social websites like Weibo [8], Tencent Qzone [5] and micro-blog [6], Bili-
bili [7] use a reputation-based system to encourage user comment review-
ing. When the users validly submit reports on violating comments and get
processed by administrators, they shall receive some credits as a proof of
contributed effort and website-wide reputation. These incentive mechanisms
share the features as follows:
• The given credits cannot be refunded or join the physical market. The
user credits can only be consumed in the website only, e.g., unlocking
new features, paying for violating rules, etc.
• There is no competition between the users who have the credits, i.e.,
usually the information about their credits is confidential.
• There is a maximum amount of credits a user can get. After achieving
the maximum, the user can still report, but will not gain anything from
reporting.
However, as we will show, these credit-based incentive mechanisms can barely
work. In fact, Tencent has closed its incentive system for years. Bilibili is still
using credits as incentives, but the achievement is far less than expectation
[9]. What is the reason that such a system fails?
It turns out the major problem is that the revenue for each report di-
minishes as the user submits more and more reports. Since the credits are
only for reputation and website use, they cannot be refunded or turn into
any monetary form. As more and more users join the website, the value of
credits will decrease since 1) there are more and more credits distributed
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to the users, and 2) a new user is often given some initial credits. These
will cause inflation-like phenomenon on the credits. However, to submit an
honest report always requires a certain amount of human effort. When the
reporting cost is larger than the diminishing revenue, any rational honest
users shall refuse to continue contributing since their utilities are in deficit.
We will explain more details in the following section.
2 The Game When Reviewing a User Com-
ment
Upon receiving a comment from another user, an honest user has three op-
tions to choose: 1) read the comment only, 2) read the comment and report
to an administrator if it violates community rules, and 3) simply discard the
comment. Clearly if the user discards the comment, she will not gain or lose
anything, and hence receives zero utility U3 = 0. We need to analyze the
rest two cases.
2.1 Notations and Preliminaries
• cr – the human effort/cost to read a comment
• p – the probability that a comment is malicious
• cp – the expected mental cost of a malicious comment
• cw – the cost to write and submit an honest report
• r – the number of credits to give when an honest report is processed
by administrator
• u – the unit revenue of one credit
• Ri – (physical or mental) revenue for choice i
• Ci – (physical or mental) cost for choice i
• Ui – (physical or mental) utility for choice i
In game theory, the utility Ui upon strategy i is defined as Ui = Ri − Ci.
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2.2 Computing Utilities
• If the user chooses to only read the comment, then with probability p
she will meet a malicious one and thus suffer a mental cost cp, and with
probability 1− p she will meet a good one. Thus the expected cost C1
of this strategy shall be
C1 = cr + p · cp.
Note that there is no revenue to the user since she did not report or
involve in reviewing. Hence for this choice, the utility is
U1 = −C1 = −cr − p · cp.
• If the user chooses to read and report, then with probability p she will
meet a malicious one, pay a mental cost, and thus write a report, and
with probability 1 − p she will see a good comment and nothing will
happen. Thus the expected cost C2 of this choice shall be
C2 = cr + p · (cp + cw).
For the revenue, with probability p the user will receive r credits for
the submitted report, while with probability 1 − p there is no credit.
Thus the expected revenue shall be
R2 = p · r · u.
Hence the utility of this choice is
U2 = R2 − C2 = −cr + p · (r · u− cp − cw).
2.3 Discussion on Strategy Choice
Clearly there is a dominating strategy: U1 < 0 = U3, i.e., a rational honest
user shall not view a malicious comment without giving any feedback or
reporting. Passively receiving negative input will only cause unhappiness or
waste of time. It is much better to simply discard the comments which are
potentially malicious. Hence we only need to discuss the choice between 2)
and 3).
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Any rational user chooses strategies based on utilities, i.e., she shall choose
2) if U2 > U3, and otherwise shall choose 3). If U2 > U3, then
−cr + p · (r · u− cp − cw) > 0,
p · r · u > cr + p · (cp + cw).
Thus the condition that a rational user will choose to read and report is:
u >
cr
p · r
+
cp + cw
r
.
Note that if the malicious probability p is very small, then u needs to be very
large to maintain the incentive mechanism. In this case the online social
community has a good environment (p is small), and thus there is no point
to sustain a reviewing scheme until a group of malicious users appear.
Given a non-negligible p, we expect the number of credits r to be as large
as possible to make u satisfy the condition above. However, since reputation-
based credits has no proof of work [10], they cannot be redeemed as money
like Bitcoin [11]. With more credits to return, the unit revenue u will change
proportionally to 1/N where N is the total amount of distributed credits.
Even though the condition can be satisfied temporarily, after some time it
will not hold any more since u keeps decreasing as the distributed credits are
accumulated. This is very similar to inflation in economics. Also we note
that a newly registered user is usually given a certain amount of credits as
the initial incentive. This policy aggravates the credit inflation problem.
If there is a maximum amount of credits a user can get, then after reaching
the maximum, the honest user will not gain anything. Then the unit revenue
u becomes zero. Thus the condition above can never be satisfied. Any
incentive mechanism with a credit bound asks honest users to leave after
they reach the full rank.
In general, the revenue function R(n), where n is the number of valid
reports submitted, is submodular [12]. The marginal revenue ∆R(n) :=
R(n + 1) − R(n) decreases as n grows, e.g., R(n) ∝ log n. Thus the unit
revenue u(n) is
u(n) =
R(n)
n
∝
log n
n
.
Suppose R(n) = α log n + β for some α ∈ R+ and β ∈ R. Then the limit of
unit revenue is zero.
lim
n→+∞
u(n) = lim
n→+∞
α logn + β
n
= 0.
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This implies in the cases of submodular revenue (very common in the real
world), there is no way to keep any rational honest user contributing valid
reports in the long term only by using credit-based incentives.
Hence in the long term, the rational honest users shall simply discard all
the user comments from the website. They will just read the news, watch
the video and nothing more. They make such a choice just because they do
not want deficit. While the honest users quit, the malicious users are still
active when making comments. This will further deteriorate the commentary
environment.
3 Remarks on Irrational Users
An important assumption in this note is that the honest users are rational.
However in the real world, some honest users will do something irrational,
e.g., getting into a comment-war with a malicious user, wasting time on
useless comments for nothing, etc. For the malicious users, it is more difficult
to predict their choices. Usually it is very difficult to model irrational entities.
More subtle models and theories may be left as future work.
4 Conclusion
This note explains 1) why many senior and honest users eventually quit the
online commentary community, becoming increasingly closed against com-
ments from others, and 2) why the reputation or credit-based incentive mech-
anisms fail to motivate the users to review comments in the long term. As
long as the credits cannot be refunded into monetary form, it is not a good
idea to base such an incentive mechanism, which motivates reporting user
comments, solely on credits.
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